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ABSTRACT: Until half a century ago, the question “what is literature?” was common in 
literary studies. Today such questions have something naïve, especially in a time that 
has become sceptical towards theories. This article tries to avoid this naïve side starting 
from two books that have enquired into the question ‘what is literature’, in an analytical 
and genealogical way (Die Logik der Dichtung by Käte Hamburger and Fiction et Diction 
by Gérard Genette) and going back to the ancient theories of poiesis and mimesis.  
KEYWORDS: Literature, Philosophy, History, Morphology, Literary genres, Plato, 
Aristotle, Käte Hamburger, Gérard Genette. 
 
 
1. Literature  
 
The word literature, such as we use it today, is the result of a cultural turn 
that took place during the eighteenth century. Before that, as we know from 
Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria (II, 1, 4), the term literatura or ars literaria was 
the Latin for the Greek techne grammatike: it pointed to whatever was said or 
written with techne with ars, or with a specific technique. Only afterwards it 
became what in Latin and Greek was called ‘poetry’ and then, during the 
eighteenth century, belles lettres (Caron 1992 and 2016, 123-139). This 
transformation is part of a greater metamorphosis affecting the whole 
western system of the arts, and dividing the fine arts (poetry, painting, 
sculpture, music; architecture had an ambiguous status) from the mechanical 
arts1 following Charles Batteux’s distinction (1746), which the Encyclopédie 
spreads all over Europe. The Critique of Judgement and the aesthetics of 
Romanticism are based on this distinction. 
In Italian culture, we find an allegorical example of this transition. Two 
works by the same title were published a century apart: Storia della 
letteratura italiana, by Girolamo Tiraboschi (1772-1782) and Storia della 
letteratura Italiana by Francesco De Sanctis (1870-71). For Tiraboschi, 
‘literature’ covers the whole of written culture (poetry, but also history, 
philosophy, eloquence, the natural sciences, mathematics, astronomy); for De 
Sanctis, literature is first of all belles lettres: poetry, narrative prose, theatre. 
Nevertheless De Sanctis keeps including philosophers, historians, scientists 
 
1 See Kristeller 1951, 496-527. 
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in the realm of literature. Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini, 
Giordano Bruno, Tommaso Campanella, Galileo Galilei, Paolo Paruta, Paolo 
Sarpi, Ludovico Antonio Muratori, Giambattista Vico are still part of his 
history of Italian literature. We find the same ambiguity in the histories of all 
western literatures: Robert Burton, John Bunyan, Edward Gibbon or John 
Ruskin belong to the history of English literature, exactly as Michel de 
Montaigne, François de La Rochefoucauld, Jules Michelet, Roland Barthes are 
part of the history of French Literature. 
What’s the common ground for the thing we call ‘literature’ today? Such 
questions have something naïve, especially in a time that has become 
sceptical towards theories. I would try to avoid this naïve side starting from 
two books that have enquired into the question ‘what is literature’, in an 
analytical and genealogical way: Die Logik der Dichtung by Käte Hamburger 
(1957, 1977) and Fiction et Diction by Gérard Genette (1991). I will start from 
Genette’s book, because Genette includes a survey of Hamburger’s theses.  
 
 
2. Fiction and Diction 
 
Literature is made with language, writes Genette, and the search for the 
essence of literature is the search for what Roman Jakobson (1960, 350-377) 
called “the poetic function of language.” According to Genette, this question 
has two possible answers: we can think that literature has an immanent 
essence or we can think any text may become literature according to context. 
In the former case, we have what Genette calls an essentialist or constitutivist 
idea of literature, in the latter, a conditional idea of literature. The former is 
older, goes back to Greek and Latin poetics and answers the question, what is 
art? The latter is recent and answers Nelson Goodman’s question when is art?2 
In order to tackle the former question, Genette starts form the text that has 
embodied this standpoint in the most influential way — Aristotle’s Poetics. 
Aristotle distinguishes between two different ways of using language, legein 
and poiein: language as ordinary medium of communication, and language as 
instrument of poiesis, of creation. What allows language to become poetry is 
what Aristotle calls mimesis, using a concept that exists since the V century 
BCE. What defines poetry, we read in the Poetics, is not the mere use of metre 
or merely telling a story. Empedocles uses verses but is not a true poet 
because in his work there is no mimesis. Likewise, Herodotus is not a poet 
because he tells stories, like poets do, but his stories lack the structure and 
the themes poets should use (Poetics, 1, 1447b; 9, 1451b). 
Mimesis is specifically based on mythos, and mythos is not any kind of 
narrative, but narrative carried out in a certain way. It must show characters 
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acting “according to verisimilitude and necessity” (Poetics, 9, 1451a 37) – in 
other words, it must show what a certain category of human beings are 
expected to do – and the plot must follow a certain order, have a beginning, a 
middle, and end. History tells what is contingent, poetry’s mythos tells what is 
universal; history can narrate anything, poetry cannot. If narrative is not 
structured according to certain laws, there is no mimesis, therefore no poetry. 
Genette, like Hamburger, insists on the constructed nature of literary 
narrative and translates mimesis with fiction.  
This essentialist idea of poetry or literature did not resist the impact of 
what it had kept out of the field. The most evident rejection deals with what, 
starting from the 16th century, was called lyric poetry. The modern idea of lyric 
comes up when poetry/literature started being divided into three great 
genres: narrative, drama, and lyric. This idea doesn’t exist in classic and 
classicist poetics. It is found for the first time in Minturno’s De poëta (1559) 
and Arte Poetica (1564) and spreads in the second half of the sixteenth 
century, above all in Italy.3  
It was a dubious partition, because in ancient poetics the word lyric had a 
different meaning. According to those who invented this new concept, lyric 
has to do with the imitation of inner passion, while for ancient poetics mimesis 
was imitation of actions, mythos, plot. But lyric poetry, as it was defined in the 
16th century, had no plot – and this was a problem for classic and classicist 
poetics. For two centuries, European classicism was sceptical about the 
notion of lyric; only with Romanticism, the new concept of lyric and the 
tripartition of literature in narrative, drama and lyric prevailed everywhere. 
In the modern, romantic idea, three were the most important features of the 
lyric as a genre: the presence of a first person speaking, the fact that this first 
person is expressing, in theory, his or her inner life, and the fact that this 
expression is affecting and changing the style of the text, making it different 
and subjective. 
Genette ignores the novelty of lyric as far as subject matters are concerned 
and focuses on form, on style. While the core of narrative and drama lies in 
the presence of fiction, the essential core of lyric is style: the idea that 
subjectivity takes shape through style seen as a “way of looking at things,” as 
Proust (1988 [1920], 261) says when he defines Flaubert’s style. According 
to Genette, this idea is born with German Romanticism and, going through 
French symbolism, it lands on Russian formalism. Ordinary language cancels 
itself qua medium, literary language never does. It rather highlights itself as 
language, playing up its form. This is what Jakobson calls “poetic function of 
language.” Genette calls it diction.  
 
3 See Behrens 1940; Croce 1958 [1945], 108-117; Fubini 1956, 143-274; Guillén 1971, 375-
419; Michałowska, 1972, 47-69; García Berrio 1977, 94-109; Genette 1992 [1979]; Johnson 
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The essentialist idea of literature is therefore made up of two parts: fiction 
and diction – texts that narrate a plot, and texts one reads because of style. 
Yet, Genette maintains that the sum of mimesis and diction is not enough to 
cover what we call literature today. They do not explain why literature also 
includes works of history, essays or autobiographies. A further idea of 
literature is therefore to be introduced. Genette calls it conditionalist. 
According to this poetics – I quote – “any text stimulating an aesthetic 
experience can be called literary.” As a conclusion, Genette (1993 [1991], 22-
23) suggests that essentialist and conditionalist poetics must overlap in order 
to have a full-fledged idea of the literary field. This is Genette’s final diagram 
(“rhematic” means “formal”):  
 
 
                    



























POETRY                                PROSE 
 
 
What is the common element of literature in its entirety? For Genette, it is 
intransitivity (1993 [1991], 25-26). This is an idea coming from Russian 
formalism and French structuralism. Diction talks about its own form; fiction 




3. Some Remarks on Fiction and Diction 
  
Before coming up with an alternative answer to the question “what is the 
common element of literature,” I would like to dwell on some aspects of 
Genette’s theory which are historically imprecise. 
 
1. The idea that literature is diction beside fiction is not born with lyric 
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notion of ars literaria, to the idea that any text written with ars, is part of 
literature.4 We insert works of science, philosophy, history into literature 
because such notion survived up to now; it is because of this notion that we 
keep finding Machiavelli, Galilei, or Vico in our histories of Italian literature. 
The idea that the essence of res literaria is style qua ars arises along with the 
tradition of rhetoric. It is not by chance that the first extended study of the 
idea of style can be found in Aristotle’s third book of Rhetoric, not in his 
Poetics. There is a long-standing theory of eloquent diction which is rooted in 
our cultural history. It doesn’t need conditionalist poetics in order to explain 
why Machiavelli, Montaigne, Ruskin or Nietzsche are parts of our histories of 
literature. 
 
2. One cannot reduce the anomalous status of lyric down to a problem of 
style. In the theory of lyric developing between the second half of the 16th 
century and the Romantic age, the core of the poetic genre is the poet’s self-
expression, and self-expression deals both with contents and style. Lyric 
poetry deviates from the idea that literature is mythos, showing that literature 
encompasses one more element. 
This element, however, is not just diction as Genette thinks: it is, first of all, 
the expression of one’s inner life. On this point Hamburger is keener than 
Genette. A number of texts that belong to literature, are there for this reason. 
Hamburger (1993 [1957, 1977], 134ff.) then adds one main consideration: 
literature’s ability to press out anybody else’s inner world is a basic element 
of fictional narrative, not only of lyric. Literature allows what is impossible in 
life, as Proust (1992 [1913], 116) remarked, it allows us to enter other 
people’s minds; Hamburger adds entering into a different person’s mind and 
treating him as a subject, not as the object of an analytical discourse, that is as 
a res (1993 [1957, 1977], 134ff.). 
 
3. My third point is the origin of conditionalist poetics. In Genette’s view, 
this poetics consists of granting the poetic function of language to all texts. He 
maintains that the poetics of French symbolism marks a crucial step in this 
process. Actually, the rise of a conditionalist poetics is linked with a general 
shift in the Western conception of art. In this particular case, from the 
standpoint of historical significance, what happens in field of the visual arts is 
more relevant than what happens in literature. The situation is radically 
altered by Marcel Duchamp and the rise of Duchamp’s paradigm – that is the 
idea that every object, if looked at in a certain way and in a certain context, 
can become and object of art.5 The literary ready-made that are produced at 
the same time are not as powerful. Duchamp’s paradigm prevails starting 
 
4 See Fumaroli 1980.  
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with the 50s and 60s of the last century, when the idea that anything can be 
art and that anything can be literature, as long as it is judged according to how 
it is written, becomes common knowledge. 
 
What’s the common ground for the thing we nowadays call “literature”? In 
the last two centuries and a half we have been counting as literature three 
types of texts: 
- texts that tell stories (Hamburger and Genette would add “stories that are 
constructed in a certain way” but more of that later); 
- texts that put into words what we normally do not see, what lies inside 
the boundaries of other people’s bodies and faces, but it does so keeping on 
dealing with those people as subjects; 
- texts that are read because they have a certain style, both according to 
the constitutive and the conditionalist standard.  
 
 
                    


































What is the common feature of the texts that make up the thing we call 
literature? Is it intransivity? We could try to answer doing what Hamburger 
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4. Aristotle  
 
In the Corpus Aristotelicum we find a philosophy of language games far 
more complex than the one we find operating in the Poetics itself and based 
on the distinction between poetry and history. In Aristotle there are five 
different language disciplines: logic (Aristotle deals with it in Organon and 
Metaphysics) dialectic (Organon, Metaphysics, Rhetoric), rhetoric (the 
eponymous work), poetry and history (both are dealt with in Poetics). Each 
discipline allows for, or forbids, certain language games: logic deals with 
syllogisms, that is with necessary connections based on necessary premises; 
dialectic deals with necessary connections based on probable premises; 
rhetoric uses arguments based on dialectical devices (enthymemes) and 
mimetic devices (examples); poetry represents human beings acting 
according to universal patters; history represents human beings behaving in 
a particular and contingent way. It is a ladder: it goes from the universal to 
the particular and involves both contents and forms. In his Organon, Aristotle 
gives rise to formal logic: he tries to create a universal language for building 
arguments and for avoiding that idiosyncratic use of words that we call style; 
Rhetoric, on the contrary, offers the first extended reflection on the particular 
ways language follows when it is used in different contexts, for different aims, 
and by different people. Aristotle’s Rhetoric is the first extended reflection on 
style and on the styles that Western culture has produced.  
If we now consider intellectual disciplines in the form they hold today, we 
may safely say that philosophy is located between logic, dialectic, and 
rhetoric, literature is set between poetry, history, and rhetoric, and 
historiography between history and rhetoric. The ladder we find in Aristotle 
is the last refining step in a process of policing knowledge which starts with 
Plato’s Republic and establishes the way Western culture organizes its 
discourse on the world. Plato sets two families of disciplines apart – poetry 
and philosophy or, broadly speaking, mimesis and conceptual knowledge. The 
former deal with particular beings who are subjected to time, placed in space 
and apparent: it accepts the world-image which appeals to the senses and to 
doxa. The latter search for non-temporal, non-placeable, non-apparent 
universals which lie behind, beneath, or above the world open to the senses 
and doxa. The latter, therefore, endeavour to catch similitudes and causes 
connecting beings and particular events, which can be seen by the mind’s eye 
alone. Behind this epistemological divide, an ontological conflict exists, 
separating two different ways of conceiving the world. It is a violent 
separation for two reasons: first, in Plato’s time poets still are seen as masters 
of truth, they still are essential part of Greek paideia, while Plato advances a 
new cultural paradigm; second, because poetry and philosophy use the same 
medium, but follow different rules and play different language games. The 
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6) maintains, is actually a civil war, a brotherly struggle. What ontology is 





Hamburger and Genette translate mimesis with fiction. According to them, 
it is a neo-aristotelian stance. They translate mimesis as ficton in order to 
underline the difference between literary and historical narrative. In their 
view, literature constructs autonomous, intransitive verbal objects, far from 
everyday language, and embodying a universal significance. However, when 
the word mimesis comes up in the 5th century BCE, its first meaning is clearly 
imitation and not fiction. The words mimos (mime as genre and the mime as 
an actor), mimeisthai (to mimic), mimema (the result of the act of mimicking), 
and mimetes (he who mimics) can be found especially in reference to the 
genre of mime and dance. Initially the act of mimeisthai signified the effects of 
a performance that was more than an aesthetic representation. It denoted 
primarily the deception practiced by the mimetes vis-à-vis those who 
watched, in other words, the relationship that is established between the 
imitator, the person imitated, and the removal of identity that imitation 
entails. In the first half of the fifth century BCE, this set of words could denote 
poetic-musical works as well as visual ones; but as early as the end of the 6th 
century BCE, Simonides had associated painting and poetry.6 In Plato’s view, 
mimetic artists try to imitate reality through their body, their language or by 
using signs, images. They reproduce reality as it appears to the senses and to 
the realm of pre-reflexive beliefs that allows human beings to understand 
each other, that is, they reproduce reality as it appears to doxa, or to what it 
will be called common sense. The Latin equivalent of mimesis is imitatio, not 
fictio. 
One of philosophy’s tasks is to describe this territory, measure out its 
boundaries, and consider if it is anthropologically unchanging or historically 
changing. As it appears in the surviving documents of western culture, 
mimesis produces a certain ontology: according to this way of conceiving the 
world, reality is made up of particular, separate individual beings, who are 
thrown out into time and space. It focuses on the dimension of particularity 
and is linked with a pre-reflexive way of conceiving the world that Husserl 
(1936, §37) calls Lebenswelt, and Strawson (1959, 10ff.) naïve realism. 
 
6 See Koller 1954; Else 1958, 73-90; Sörbom 1966; Vernant 1991 [1978], 164-185; Nagy 
1989, 1-77; and especially Halliwell 2002, 15ff. In works by Plato, the term mimesis has 
many meanings, and the imitative activity is judged in different, sometimes contradictory 
ways (a detailed analysis can be found in Halliwell 2002, chaps. 1-4, in Büttner 2000, and in 
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Plato came first in shaping a new intellectual figure who thinks that this 
ontology is naïve – the philosopher. Philosophy begins when doxa and 
appearances are subdued by the intellectual act of reflection, which makes the 
ontology of the particular seem naïve. Philosophy subdues a whole range of 
particulars to a universal class and it searches after causes, it pursues the 
principle of sufficient reason asking itself “why?”, transforming the events 
and individual beings into phenomena of a universal law. Mimesis, on the 
contrary, moves on a different plane of reality. When it uses words, and 
becomes the thing we call literature, mimesis does three things: it recounts 
the path that some characters follow in a particular world; it enters the inner 
world of a character, or it dwells on the style of discourses – that is on the 
means a human or anthropomorphic being uses to give shape to his or her 
world. Cutting very short, literature deals with particulars. If one wants to find 
a concise aspect of its nature, one can use the metaphor of the trace. Literature 
tells about the traces that particulars leave behind in the world: the path that 
characters follow in a plot, the mark of an inner world (etymologically 
character means imprint), it tells about style as imprint, as a stilus engraving 
a wax slab. Literature is not characterized by the intransitive, but by the 
particular. It aims at a mathesis singularis: particulars that catch universals 
without going through concepts. It works by projections, by thoughtless 
recognition, by all that one means in the sentence floating behind any 
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